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Abstract - This paper extends the framework provided by the so-called GHM approach to a context of 
endogenous outside options, showing how the optimality of property rights assignment might be reversed. In 
some cases, non-owners could over-invest in specific assets while having mere access to property rights might 
not prevent hold-up. Our conclusions suggest that in order to reach the desired optimality features, the design of 
ownership structure should take into account the dynamics of 
outside options. 
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 1 Introduction1
New Institutional Economics2 has focused on the hold-up problem that arises
in the absence of ex-post veriﬁability. Investment in speciﬁc assets may ex-
pose investors to the risk of opportunistic behaviour by contractual counter-
parties, who may impose a renegotiation of the terms contracted upon (the
so-called hold-up problem). Under this framework, contractual parties have
strong incentives to under-invest in asset speciﬁcity due to the risk of coun-
terpart’s opportunistic behaviour and, therefore, the potential quasi-rents –
which might be generated by speciﬁc investments – are almost completely
dissipated. The GHM3 approach has outlined a theory of optimal allocation
of property rights as a second best solution to hold-up. In this paper we ex-
tend this framework by assuming that parties’ outside options are inﬂuenced
by the investments made (Nicita and Vatiero, 2007). The economic reason to
consider endogenous outside options relies on the circumstance that, intitu-
ively, since quasi-rents4 are measured with respect to parties’outside options,
there should be some interdependence between quasi-rents and outside op-
tions also at the moment in which parties decide to make investments. As
Kessler and Lulfesmann (2007) have pointed out, 5 since outside options act
as a default point in the bargaining game when the outside option princi-
ple6 applies, then the ex-post value of parties’ outside options is crucial in
determining parties’ ex-post bargaining power. This implies, as de Meza and
1A previous version of this paper has been presented at the 2006 EALE Conference in
Madrid. We would like to thank Francesco Parisi, Ed Iacobucci, Alan Schwartz, Emanuela
Carbonara, Ugo Pagano, Bruno De ains, Eric Brousseau, Stefan Saussier and Alessandra
Rossi for helpful discussion. Usual disclaimers apply.
2Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990;
Hart, 1995; Williamson, 1985
3Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995
4Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978
5In particular they argue that in a in incomplete contract between an employer and an
employee who has to make speciﬁc investments in learning “although the (above market)
rent depends only on the worker’s speciﬁc human capital, the way in which it is shared also
depends on his general skills. In particular, as long as the external market opportunity
of the worker (which fully reﬂects his marginal product from general training) is binding,
negotiations will lead to the going market wage.”
6The outside option principle asserts that the outside option of opportunistic agent,
in the renegotiation game, acts as a constraint on the ex-post equilibrium division. See
Sutton, 1980; Osborne and Rubinstein, 1988; MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993; Lyon and
Rasmussen, 2004.
2Lockwood (1997), Kessler and Lulfesmann (2007) and Chatterjee and Chiu
(2007) acknowledge, that under an incomplete contract framework, beside
the crucial decision on the degree of the speciﬁc investments to be made,
parties also maintain strong incentives to control outside option dynamics in
order to improve or defend their bargaining position in the ex-post renego-
tiation game. The perspective of endogenous outside options in incomplete
contracts raises new incentives, new dynamics and new equilibria, quite ne-
glected in standard literature.
While GHM assumed that investors’ outside option are positively a ected by
the investment made but only to a limited extent, i.e. such that, by assump-
tion, investor’s outside option is never binding ex-post, we consider here a
broader framework where in some case endogenous outside options turn to
be binding ex-post. The application of the outside option principle in our
setting may lead to counterintuitive results: each party might be induced
to select those investments that negatively a ect the other party’s outside
options and hence enhance their share of the ﬁnal surplus in the ex-post
bargaining. Moreover, this e ect, which is deﬁned here as ‘cross competition
e ect’, is further magniﬁed when each party’s investments positively a ect
his own outside option as well (as in the standard assumption of GHM).
Under this framework, parties’ investments may increase the ex-post compe-
tition between the contractual parties, reducing each party’s outside options
to an extent that depends on the impact of each investment on investors’
competitors. This ex-post e ect of competition, quite neglected in the stan-
dard literature, may actually reduce, at the margin, each party’s incentive to
choose the general-purpose investment, altering quite dramatically the inef-
ﬁciency that the hold-up problem generates. In some circumstances, parties
may even over-invest rather than under-invest. According to the impact of
these investments on each party’s outside options investment decisions may
result in ine cient rent dissipation, even if in some cases the negative e ect
of rent dissipation might be mitigated by the endogenous enforcement e ect
realized by the parties’ strategies over ex-post competition. We ﬁnally show
that, contrary to GHM, the role played by property rights allocation in pro-
ducing optimal incentives to invest in speciﬁc assets strictly depends on the
impact exerted by investments on parties’ outside options. Our conclusions
suggest, in line with Chatterjee and Chiu (2007), but in a wider framework
of outsid eoptions dynamics, that the design of optimal ownership struc-
ture for the governance of incomplete contracts should take onto account the
3dynamics of market competition to preserve ex-post e ciency.
Some other recent contributions have addressed the analysis of the impact
of endogenous outside options in an incomplete contract framework. Among
these, Segal and Whinston (2000) analyze the role of exlcusivity clause with
endogenous outside options generated by coopertaive investments, while here
we focus on the case of zero brach penalties and speciﬁc self-investments; de
Meza and Lockwood (1998) have formalised the role of outside and ‘inside’
options on the renegotiation game under a repeated setting. This is not
the case of the model here addressed, where it is assumed a simple take-
it-or leave-it choice in a one-shot game. MacLeod and Malcomson (1993)
show how exogenous variations of parties’ outside options in an incomplete
contract may a ect the threat point of the renegotiation game, a conclu-
sion reached also by Edlin and Hermalin (1998). Here, the analysis goes
further by stressing the crucial strategic role played by the choice of the
investmentwith respect to their impact on parties’ outside options. Bolton
and Whinston (1993) formalize the case where, under a seller’s monopoly,
buyers downstream competition a ects their incentive to invest. Although
they are concerned with market-contracts interactions, their analysis is not
fully developed in an incomplete contracts, neither they provide an explana-
tion of the choice between investments a ecting joint-surplus and/or outside
options. Finally, the analysis of the role competition plays in a ecting in-
vestment incentives in incomplete contracts has been independently pointed
out by Kessler and Lulfesmann (2007) and by Chatterjee and Chiu (2007),
who study agents’ investment decisions between general purpose and speciﬁc
investments with interdependent outside options. The article by Chatterjee
and Chiu7 is the only one we are aware of in which market-contracts in-
teractions are explicitly pointed out and investigated. Aside from the basic
di erences in the formulation of the models, the analysis here proposed dif-
fers in some respects. While the paper by Chatterjee and Chiu puts very
interesting insights under a property rights perspective, in the model here
developed, cross competition equilibria are reached ﬁrst regardless of asset
ownership, extending thus the analysis of contractual enforcement to situ-
ation characterized by zero property rights. Moreover, we outline here the
case for unilateral and bilateral over-investment equilibria. In our analysis
overinvestment level is greater than the e cient level of investments and this
7The authors kindly address our similar independent result. We here use the level of
investment, rather than the type of investment as the focus of our analysis.
4marks a crucial di erence with contributions by Grossman and Hart (1986),
Bolton and Whinston (1993), Chung (1996), Chatterjee and Chiu (2007),
Kessler and Lulfesmann (2007). The analysis by Grossman and Hart (1986)
and by Kessler and Lulfesmann (2007) di ers from ours since they assume
thatif a party over-invests the counterpart will under-invest and vice-versa;
Bolton and Whinston are not concerned with speciﬁc versus general-purpose
investments; Chung’s (1996) notion of over-investment di ers from the one
here proposed because it is referred to under-investments level rather than
to e cient speciﬁc investments. We in particular focus on the co-existence of
multiple equilibria in bilateral over-investment, both in speciﬁc and general
purpose investments, neglected by previous literature and then analyze the
impact on property rights allocation.
2 The Grossman-Hart-Moore (GHM) model
Let us assume a set of assets A =( a1,a 2) and a set of agents M =( B,S). S
(the seller), in combination with asset a2, produces a single unit of a widget
z which is acquired as an input by B (the buyer) at the price P or by a third
party at a price p, with P > p, determined according to parties’ contractual
power8. Let us assume that prior to trading, both B and S make a speciﬁc
self-investment that enhances respectively the marginal revenue for B and
reduces the marginal cost of production for S. The marginal return to the
investments depends on whether or not trade occurs between B and S9.
When S trades with B the net total surplus generated W is given by10
8Symmetrically, B can purchase the widget, either from S (speciﬁc-relationship), or
from the spot market. In combination with own a1, B uses this widget z to produce an
output x that is sold on the output market.
9Note that, in this respect, investments are made at t =0 , and the widget is supplied
at t =1 , that is, there is uncertainty about the type of the widget which B will require in
t =1 .
10Denote B’s relationship-speciﬁc investment at t =0by i – a non-negative number
representing the level and cost of the investment; R(i) denotes the B’s revenue with the
trade and P is the agreed widget price. If trade does not occur, B buys a ‘non-speciﬁc’
widget from an outside for price p and the B’s revenue is denoted by r(i). In the same
manner, e symbolized the Seller’s level and cost of investment, C(e) the production cost
with the trade and c(e) the production cost outside the trade. Under the setting already
described, the capital letters represent the speciﬁc variables, whilst the lower case letters
the non-speciﬁc (or market) ones.
5W = R(i)   P + P   C (e)   (i + e)=R(i)   C (e)   (i + e)
When S or B trade with third parties, the net total surplus w is given by
w = r(i)   p + p   c(e)   (i + e)=r(i)   c(e)   (i + e)
Let us assume11 that there are always gains, namely a surplus, from trade
between S and B12, that is: W > w > 0.
When contracts are complete, e cient trade between S and B will always
occur, with S and B choosing respectively the investment levels e  and i 
that maximize W and satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions:
R
  (i ;a1)=1 (1)
 C
  (e ;a2)  (2)
leading to an equilibrium on the Pareto frontier, determined according to
parties’ ex-ante contractual power.
Proof.
In a world with contractual completeness, the investment levels i and e,
considering the net present value of the trading relationship W, are given by
the ﬁrst order conditions:
 R(i;a1)
 i   1=R  (i ;a1)   1=0e




   
    1= C  (e;a2)  1=0
Therefore, the optimal value i  and e  is given by [1] and [2].
When contracts are incomplete, parties will choose their investments non-
cooperatively, leading to equilibrium into the second best area and the Pareto
11Other three important assumptions are:
1. the parties are risk-neutral;
2. the parties have unlimited amounts of initial wealth;
3. the interest rate is zero.
12This condition shows the idea that investments i and e are relation-speciﬁc.
6frontier is not achieved. We can calculate the quasi-rent (QR) of the invest-
ments in a world with contractual incompleteness:
QR
B = R(i)   P   [r(i)   p] > 0
QR
S = P   C (e)   [p   c(e)] > 0
By ex-post Nash bargaining we obtain the net ex-post payo s.
B  
 i = r p+a[R   C   (r   c)] i =  p aC+ac+aR+(1   a)r i (3)
S  
 e = p c+(1   a)[R   C   (r   c)] e = p ac+(1   a)R (1   a)C (1   a)r e
(4)
Di erentiating [3] with respect to i and [4] with respect to e yields the fol-
lowing necessary and su cient conditions:
aR
  (i) + (1   a)r
  (i) = 1 (5)
(1   a) C
  (e)  + a c
  (e)  =1
These ﬁrst order conditions lead to a Pareto inferior equilibrium with re-
spect to complete contractual conditions. The main contribution of the GHM
model is that of showing the relevance of property rights assignment on the
degree of underinvestment in an incomplete contract framework. In this ap-
proach the ownership of physical assets matters because it increases investors’
ex-post outside options after investments are made; namely
R  (i;A) >r   (i;a1,a 2)   r  (i;a1)   r  (i;Ø)  i :0<i<  for B
 C  (e;A)  >  c  (e;a1,a 2)    c  (e;a2)    c  (e;Ø)   e :0<e<  for S
The intuition here is that ownership is a source of power since it assigns to
the owner the residual right to control over non-contractible uses, even when
trade occurs with third parties. The allocation of ownership over assets de-
termines the returns to investments. As a consequence, ownership determines
7parties’ incentives to choice the degree of speciﬁc investments. Moreover, in
GHM’s model, investors’ outside options are positively correlated with own-
ership. This is precisely the reason why ownership increases incentives to
invest: since investor’s outside options raise with investment, it is convenient
for the owner to invest in any event, independently of counterpart’s decision
to maker or not cooperative speciﬁc investments. On the other hand, non-
owner’s incentives to make relationship-speciﬁc investments is reduced in the
above framework: since non-owner’s outside options are not a ected by the
investment made, there is no reason for a rational agent to invest in speciﬁc
assets if she is not also the owner of the assets in which the investment is em-
bedded. As a result, the full cooperative outcome will not reached and only
second best outcomes could be a orded in the above framework. Thus, in the
GHM model, since the allocation of property rights on physical assets can
a ect the degree of under-investment, the hold-up problem is transformed
into the problem of selecting the ownership structure which ensures second
best outcomes, provided that every ownership structure shows both (private)
beneﬁts and (social) costs.
3 Incomplete contracts with endogenous out-
side options
In the GHM model it is assumed that ownership a ects investors’ outside
options. In particular, it is assumed that even when trade occurs with third
parties, the incentive to raise the level of speciﬁcity of investments increases
with the number of assets owned by investors. That, in turn, implies that we
are assuming an ex-post market structure according to which the market
opportunities for owners, after investments are made, are always greater
than the ex-ante competitive conditions associated to generic investments.
However, it assumed that these opportunities are never so great to overcome
the ﬁrst best gains from trading with the original counterpart. What happens
to the above framework if we extend the GHM model to allow parties to a ect
outside options in such a way to improve their ex-post pay-o  when trading
with third parties, independently of gaining access to property rights? In
other words, what happens to the above framework if we assume that parties’
investments maintain the possibility to monopolize the market?
Let us assume ﬁrst that the investor can sink economic resources with the
8purpose of monopolizing the market. That means that he will increase his
own outside option while reducing counterparts’ outside options. Let us
consider the case of a buyer B (a similar result could be shown for the seller)
being able to select a speciﬁc investment such as to increase her valuation of
contracting with third parties (as in the GHM model) while increasing the
seller’s cost to trade with third parties. The net ex-post pay-o  of agents
will be given by:
B  
 i =  p   aC (e)+ac(e,i)+aR(i) + (1   a)r(i)   i










Thus we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Countervailing e ect of speciﬁc investments
When in the above setting, buyer’s investment is such that c  (i) > 0, i.e. if
B’s investment has the e ect of increasing the seller’s cost of trading with
third parties, thus the speciﬁc investment may have a countervailing e ect









  (i)   r
  (i)] (7)
the countervailing e ect is such to produce a buyer’s marginal return equal
to the buyer’s quasi-rent associated with cooperative speciﬁc investments on
both sides.
Proof.
It is easy to show that when [7] holds, [6] becomes
 
 B




a   1
 
[R  (i)   r  (i)]
 
=1  R  (i) = 1, which is the ﬁrst order condi-
tion for buyer’s e cient investments.
9Proposition 2. Countervailing e ect and second best outcomes
In the above setting the countervailing e ect generates a marginal return on
investment for the buyer which is always higher than that associated with
full ownership in the GHM model.
Proof.
Compare [5] with [6].
What is the economic meaning of propositions 1 and 2? The intuition here
is to extend further the assumption held by the GHM model in order to con-
sider the case in which investor may sink economic resources (represented
by i and e) not only to increase their own outside options, as in the GHM
model, but also to decrease counterparties’ outside options. That is the case
in which by increasing the level of the investment with respect to the underin-
vestment level produces some e ects on counterparties’ outside options. The
ex-post reduction of counterparts’ outside options can have several economic
explanations. The main argument is that, since as in GHM parties’ outside
options act as default point in the ex-post renegotiation game, it is rationale
to attempt to a ect outside options in a way to increase ex-post bargaining
power. While in GHM the only possibility to a ect outside options is that of
having access to the ownership of the assets involved in the production pro-
cess, we show that another possibility is that of strategically sink economic
resources with the purpose of decreasing counterparts’ outside options.
One rationale for that could be found in the entry deterrence e ect gener-
ated by the investor on ex-post competitors (who represent, in fact, coun-
terparty’s outside options) as in Dixit (1980). If the investor is the buyer,
in the extreme case studied by Dixit any amount of i greater than the un-
derinvestment level generates a deterrence e ect on competitors so as to
induce them to exit the market and/or to inhibit their entry by raising their
costs to compete (Salop and Sche man, 1983). Consequently, it would be
rational for the buyer to select that amount, since this strategy will increase
her ex-post gains from trade. Between the extreme cases studied by Dixit
and the underinvestment equilibrium analyzed by GHM there is a range of
value in which a lower degree of underinvestment increases ex-post investor’s
contractual power through the increase in market power generated by the
change induced in parties’ outside options. Comparing this conclusion with
the literature on incomplete property rights, allows us to show an important
10result: access to property rights could not be a su cient safeguard against
post-contractual opportunism under any circumstance, as in the GHM con-
text. When parties may a ect market conﬁguration through their investment
choices, market dynamics may be a crucial factor in determining parties’ ex-
post bargaining power. This result is twofold: on the one hand, it shows
that ex-post market conﬁguration may a ect parties’ incentives to invest so
that the ability to ex-post monopolize relevant markets may positively align
incentives to make speciﬁc investments; on the other hand, it shows that
property rights assignment may not be as crucial as parties’ ability to ex-
post monopolize relevant markets under an incomplete contract framework.
This is argued in the next paragraph.
4 Property rights allocation with endogenous
outside options
An important issue to be pointed out is that the countervailing e ect deﬁned
above does not necessarily depend on the allocation of property rights to the
buyer. In particular, when the countervailing e ect is so large that proposi-
tion 1 holds even if all the assets are attributed to the seller and the set of
assets owned by B is empty, with AB =   AB = Ø, the buyer will select the







i;   AB
 
+ (1   a)r
 
 









One general consequence of the above argument regards the existence of
strong incentives for the investing ﬁrm to monopolize the market, under an
incomplete contract framework, even when it has not access to any property
rights on physical assets.
Proposition 3. Countervailing e ect and irrelevance of property
rights assignment
























i;   AB
  
(8)
11with   AS = {a1,a 2} and   AB = Ø.
then the assignment of property rights is irrelevant for the selection of speciﬁc
investments both on the side of the buyer and on the side of the seller.
Proof
[8] implies that the countervailing e ect is such to induce speciﬁc investment
by the non-owner (the buyer) and to inhibits speciﬁc investments by the
owner (the seller), as long as the impact of buyer’s investment outweighs the
impact of ownership on seller’s outside option.
Proposition 3 also deﬁnes, on the opposite side, the conditions under which
property rights matter in inducing speciﬁc investments by the seller. That
is the case in which the allocation of property rights to the seller inhibits





 i =0 .
Generally, however, it is reasonable to assume that market competition is
more seriously relevant when we assume that a ’competition e ect’ is as







 i  
 c(e,i;AB=(a1))
 i  
 c(e,i;AB=(a1,a2))
 i for the buyer
   
 









   
 


















  for the seller.
In other words, ownership matters, under the above assumptions, when hav-
ing exclusive access to given scarce assets is crucial in order to a ect parties’
outside option. Thus we have here a ﬁrst puzzling result: under incomplete
contracts with endogenous outside options, ownership is crucial in positively
a ecting incentives to make speciﬁc investments only when it is crucial also to
monopolize markets. As a consequence, from a consumers’ welfare perspec-
tive, the e ciency of proprietary integration (in terms of investors’ ex-ante
incentives) needs to be compared with the ine ciency associated to market
monopolization (in terms of dead weight loss). This conclusion is particularly
relevant for antitrust evaluation of horizontal and vertical mergers.
125 The emergence of ‘Cross competition’ equi-
libria
When, B can a ect c with his investment i, and symmetrically S can a ect
r with his investment e the ﬁrst order conditions become:
aR





(1   a) C
  (e)  + a c
  (e,i)  +
   
   
 (1   a)
 r(e)
 e
   
   
  (10)
Proof.
departing from [3] and [4], the net ex-post payo s become:
B  
 i =  p   aC (e)+ac(e,i)+aR(i) + (1   a)r(i,e)   i
S  
 e = p   ac(e,i) + (1   a)R(i)   (1   a)C (e)   (1   a)r(i,e)   e
Di erentiating the former net payo  over i and the latter with respect to e
yields the condition [9] and [10].








    describe the two countervailing e ects which
deﬁnes the cross-competition. Indeed, the comparison between [9] and [10]
highlights the e ect of seller’s investment e on buyer’s maximization calculus.
Following terminology of Bulow et al. (1985), we may analyze investments
as either strategic substitutes or strategic complements. Roughly speaking,
one party’s strategic substitutary investment lowers counterparty’s market
position. On the contrary, one party’s strategic complementary investment
raises counterparty’s market position. We will focus on the former case, that
is we assume that
 c(i)
 i   0 and
 r(e)
 e   0. However, the latter case may
occur when a relative improving of party’s market position with respect to
counterparty determines a relative ‘more’ improving of counterparty’s market
position with respect to her competitors.
Comparing [1] with (9) and (2) with (10) leads us to extend Proposition 1,
as follow.
13Proposition 4. Cross competition equilibria
When both parties may a ect outside options, cross-competition e ects may
counterbalance, under given assumptions, the losses associated to bilateral
under-investments.
Proof.
It is su cient to compare the following equilibria:
• if (1   a)R  (i) > (1   a)r  (i)+a
 c(i)
 i and a C  (e)  >a  c  (e)  +    
 (1   a)
 r(e)
 e
   
 , then the underinvestment level persists;
• if (1   a)R  (i) = (1   a)r  (i)+a
 c(i)
 i and a C  (e)  = a c  (e)  +  




   , then the optimal investment level is achieved;
• if (1   a)R  (i) < (1   a)r  (i)+a
 c(i)
 i and a C  (e)  <a  c  (e)  +  
 





 , then bilateral over-investments levels are generated.
Proposition 4 illustrates the fact that parties – by their investments endoge-
nously set parties’ market positions – increases the whole incentives to invest
with respect to a context with exogenous outside options. Therefore, even
with contractual incompleteness both parties may over-invest, or at least not
under-invest, with respect to optimum level. However, the e ects of an higher
level of investments by parties may be compensated by an higher level of in-
vestments by counterparty, leaving the parties’ market positions partially or
totally unchanged and dissipating partially or totally both investments in
outside options. As a result, parties with symmetric and commons knowl-
edge on e ects of this “dissipating” cross competition may be discouraged by
investments in outside options, determining a parallelism on the behaviours
and under-investments level.
6 Optimal property rights assignment with en-
dogenous outside options
Let us consider now how the assumption of endogenous outside options a ects
the criteria outlined by GHM in order to proceed to an optimal assignment of
14property rights under an incomplete contracts framework. The propositions
below show how the particular case analyzed by the GHM model is one in
which it is assumed
 r(e;AS)
 e  
 c(i;AB)
 i =0 . In fact, the GHM solution holds
unequivocally only when the impact of investments on counterparty’s outside
option is zero.
• Productivity of the investment. The productivity degree denotes the
impact of investments on aggregate surplus. The GHM model shows
that if S’ investment is comparatively estimable as one with low pro-
ductivity, then it is optimal to assign to B the integrated ownership
with AB =( a1,a 2). The GHM conclusion can be reversed if the dy-
namics of endogenous outside options is such that nonowner is induced
to over-invest in decreasing counterpart’s outside option and/or to in-
crease own outside option. If it occurs, then the optimal allocation
of ownership should take into account the (cross) e ects generated on
incentives by alternative assignements.
• Independency degree of assets. Assets a1and a2 are independent if
 r(i;AB=(a1,a2))




 e  
 c(e;AS=(a2))
 e . When
the assets are independent, according to GHM model, it is optimal to
implement partial ownership with AB =( a1) and AS =( a2). This






 e  
 r(e;AS=(a2))
 e , that is,
such that ownership stimulates buyer (and not the seller) to invest in
order to reduce the seller’s outside option. When the latter case occurs,
then the integrated ownership with AB =( a1,a 2) is comparatively more
e cient in order to stimulate the higher aggregate level of investments.
• Complementarity degree of assets. Assets a1 and a2 are strictly com-
plementary if either
 r(i;AB=(a1))
















 e . In this case, according to the GHM model, it is optimal
to implement the integrated ownership, respectively AB =( a1,a 2) or
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, then the integrated ownership reduces competition dy-
15namics in the market, and partial ownership might better perform in
this case.
• Essentiality of human capital. B’s human capital is essential if
 c(e;AB=(a1,a2))







 e . In this case13, according to GHM model, it is optimal to
implement the integrated ownership of type AB =( a1,a 2). However, it
might occur that
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, namely integrated
ownership discourage seller’s investments in outside options. Then a
partial ownership might better perform.
7 Conclusions
Since the seminal works by Williamson (1985) and by Grossman and Hart
(1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), a large number of papers have dealt
with the problem of property rights arrangements in an incomplete contract
framework. In these models, since relationship-speciﬁc human capital invest-
ments increase the marginal return of the physical assets involved, investor’s
outside option is partially a ected by the investment selected. However, a
crucial assumption in most of these models is that a party’s outside option
(i.e. counterpart’s competitors) is never binding ex-post and furthermore it
is never a ected by the investment made by the other party, i.e. that ex-post
competitors are not a ected by the actions (investments) by parties.
We have extended previous litertare by studying a two stage incomplete con-
tract between a buyer and a seller, with speciﬁc investments and endogenous
outside options. We have explicitly considered the case of a party’s outside
13Note that:
1. the assumption of essentiality of human capital is the sum combination of comple-
mentarity and independency of assets. In other words, in GHM’s view, there is
essential human capital when the partial ownership structure and the integrated
ownership with allocation of residual property right at the owner of physical assets
is ine cient.
2. This is the same result of situation with seller’s null productivity investment.
3. If both human capitals are essential then every ownership structure is e cient.
16option being a ected by the investment made by the other contractual party.
Given that the outside option of an agent identiﬁes the potential competi-
tors of the contractual counterpart, with such endogenous outside options,
a party is induced to invest strategically in order to encourage counterpart’s
competitors and/or to deter own competitors, by raising the exit costs of
the other contractual party. The model proposed extends the framework
provided by the so-called New Property Rights School, also known as GHM
approach, in that it explicitly allows for outside options being a ected by the
investments made by parties. The paper thus shows that the role played by
property rights allocation in producing optimal incentives to invest in spe-
ciﬁc assets strictly depends on the impact exerted by investments on parties’
outside options.
This complexity calls for a broader notion of transaction in which the notion
of enforcement costs should also integrate the wide range of competition costs
which parties may sustain in order to improve their market position against
competitors and actual and potential counterparts (Chatterjee and Chiu,
2007; Nicita and Vatiero, 2007). A clear deﬁnition of a complex transaction
may be found in Commons’ (1924) idea that:
“the choice of opportunities is always a choice between the two
best accessible options at the moment of choice, and if there is no
possible alternative, then the exchange may be that of “hold-up”
character [...] in which there is no real freedom of choice [...].
Thus there is a gradation of alternatives taken into account by
each party to a transaction, and consequently, from the stand-
point of the motives a ecting the parties, the minimum number
of persons necessary to constitute a transaction is four parties,
two buyers and two sellers, namely, the actual buyer and seller,
and the next best alternative for each”.
The main results of the paper are as follows. First, depending on the degree
of ex-post market competition, (i) contractors may have strong incentives to
make an over-investment (speciﬁc or general purpose) even when they have
no access to property rights; (ii) over-investment may act as an endogenous
enforcement device. With endogenous outside options the parties’ strategic
interdependence could be inﬂuenced by the parties’ ability to use ex-post
market competition as a discipline device in an incomplete contract.
17While the GHM approach emphasizes the e cient role played by property
rights allocation in inducing at least one party to make e cient investment,
we have shown how the optimality feature of rights’ assignments strictly
depends on the ex-post variation of parties outside options. With endogenous
outside options owners and non-owners may over-invest independently of
any initial ownership structure. We may conclude that the with endogenous
outside options, in order to proceed to an optimal allocation of property
rights (also in terms of reduced dissipation induced by over-investments) we
should also consider the relevance of bilateral perspective changes under any
ownership structure, thus comparing, in our example the variation induced
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where A represents the ownership structure.
Our results shed light over the e ciency induced by alternative property
rights allocation in a context of endogenous outside options, showing how uni-
lateral and bilateral over-investments may be an equilibrium. We show how
the characteristics of productivity’s degree of investments, independency’s
degree of assets, complementarity’s degree of assets, essentiality of human
capital, represent su cient conditions – in order to estimate the choice of
ownership structure – only in a world without outside options or with ﬁxed
outside options. Our conclusions suggest that the design of optimal owner-
ship structure for the governance of incomplete contracts should take onto
account the dynamics of market competition to fully evaluate ex-post e -
ciency feature of the emerging equilibria.
References
[1] BOLTON P. and M. D. WHINSTON (1993), “Incomplete Contracts,
Vertical Integration and Supply Assurance”, Review of Economic Stud-
ies, 60 (1):121-48.
[2] CHATTERJEE K. and Y. S. CHIU (2007), When Does Competition
Lead to E cient Investments?," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Eco-
nomics: Vol. 7 : Iss. 1 (Topics), Article 27.
18[3] CHUNG T.Y., (1996), “On Strategic Commitment versus Investment”,
American Economic Review, Papers and Proocedings, pp. 437- 41.
[4] COMMONS J.R. (1924), Legal Foundations of Capitalism. Augustus M.
Kelley Publishers, Clifton [reprinted, 1974].
[5] de MEZA D. and B. LOCKWOOD (1998), “Does Asset Ownership Al-
ways Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights
Theory of the Firm”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(2): 361-86.
[6] DIXIT A. (1980), “The role of investment in entry deterrence”. Economic
Journal, 90: 95-106.
[7] Edlin, Aaron S & Hermalin, Benjamin E, 2000. "Contract Renegoti-
ation and Options in Agency Problems," Journal of Law, Economics
and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 395-423,
October.
[8] GROSSMAN S. and O.D. HART (1986), “The Costs and Beneﬁts of
Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration”. Journal of
Political Economy, 94:691–719.
[9] HART O. and J. MOORE (1990), “Property rights and the Nature of
the Firm”, Journal of Political Economy, 98:1119-58.
[10] HART O. (1995), Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure. Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
[11] Kessler Anke S. & Christoph Lülfesmann, 2006. "The Theory of Hu-
man Capital Revisited: on the Interaction of General and Speciﬁc In-
vestments," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(514),
pages 903-923, October.
[12] KLEIN B., R. G. CRAWFORD and A. ALCHIAN (1978), “Vertical Inte-
gration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process”.
Journal of Law and Economics, 21:297-300.
[13] Lyon Thomas P. and Eric Rasmusen (2004) “Buyer-Option Contracts
Restored: Renegotiation, Ine cient Threats, and the Hold-Up Problem”
in Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 20,1: 148-169 (April
2004).
19[14] MACLEOD B. and J. MALCOMSON (1993), “Investments, hold-up,
and the form of market contracts", American Economic Review, 83:811-
37.
[15] NICITA A. (2001), “The Firm as an evolutionary enforcement device”.
In Nicita A. and U. Pagano (eds) The Evolution of Economic Diversity,
Routledge.
[16] NICITA A. and M. VATIERO (2007),“The Contract and the Market:
Towards a Broader Notion of Transaction?”. Studi e Note di Economia,
1:1-20.
[17] OSBORNE M. and A. RUBINSTEIN (1988), Bargaining and Markets,
Academic Press
[18] SALOP S. and D.T. SCHEFFMAN (1983), “Raising Rivals’ Costs”.
American Economic Review, 73.
[19] SEGAL I. and M.D. WHINSTON (2000), “Naked exclusion: Comment”.
American Economic Review, 90:296-309.
[20] SUTTON, John. 1986. “Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Intro-
duction,” 53 Review of Economic Studies 709-724.
[21] WILLIAMSON O. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism.
Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting. The Free Press, New York.
20